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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20150003-CA
FELICIA JOYCE ANDERSON,
Defendant/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, HON. BARRY G. LAWRENCE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(9). This matter
originated in a Justice Court, and the District Court ruled on the constitutionality of
~

a statute.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
B QUESTIONS OF LAW:
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5, which purports to require an escort
licensed by a city in Salt Lake County to licensed in each City in which she may
1

incidentally perform, violate Defendant's rights to free expression under the First

~

Amendment;
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R. 72.

~

The Court denied the motion, R. 119. This is a question of statutory construction and
constitutional interpretation. It is a legal questions that is reviewed for correctness,
according no deference to the decision of the District Court. See State v. J.M.S.
(State ex rel. J.M.S.), 20111 UT 75,280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and Bushco v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 225 P.3d 153, 2009 UT 73 (Utah 2009).
2. Does this statute violate Defendant's rights to Equal Protection of the Law
under the Fourteenth Amendment?
These issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss , R.
72.

The Court denied the motion, R. 119.

This is a question of statutory

construction and constitutional interpretation. It is a legal question that is reviewed
for correctness, according no deference to the decision of the District Court. See
State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. J.M.S.)~ 20111 UT 75,280 P.3d 410 (Utah 2011); and
Bushco v. Utah State Tax Commission, 225 P.3d 153, 2009 UT 73 (Utah 2009).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE

2

~

~

~

United States Constitution Amendment I

Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances ..
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State in which
they reside. No State shall made or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the Untied States; nor shall any State
deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah Article I, Sec. 7.

No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5:
A person employed in a sexually oriented business may not work in a
municipality if the municipality requires that a person employed in a sexually
oriented business be licensed individually.
Sandy City Code§ § 5-18-3:

It is unlawful for any person to operate an agency, be employed by an agency,
or perform escort or outcall services, within the City, without first obtaining
a valid license from the business license authority.
This section of the Sandy City Code is part of Title 5 Chapter 18, which regulates

3

Escort Agencies in some detail. A complete copy of that Chapter is contained in an

~

Addendum to this Brief. Also included is the Midvale City Ordinance regulating the
same conduct.
STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF CASE

Defendant, an employee of an Escort Service licensed in the City of Midvale,
also has an individual license as an Escort from that City. Defendant was requested,
on or about September 12, 2013, by an undercover police officer to come to Sandy
for an escort appointment, at a Sandy hotel. After some small talk, she was cited for
performing as an escort without a Sandy City License. She filed a Motion to Dismiss
in Sandy Justice Court, alleging a violation of her commercial speech rights and her
right to the Equal protection of the Law. Her motion was denied, and she was
convicted of the license violation in a bench trial. She appealed her conviction to
the District Court in West Jordan. R. 15. Once again she filed a Motion to Dismiss
on constitutional grounds. R. 72; and once again the Motion was denied. R. 119. She
was convicted of the violation after a bench trial R. 14 7; and filed a timely appeal
with this Court. R. 136.
The District Court in Salt Lake County previously ruled in a number of
4

~

((f)

separate cases that a city had no authority to license an escort who worked for a
business licensed in another city. R. 88. In 20 IO the legislature enacted Utah Code
Ann. § I 0-8-41.5, which specifically gives authority to cities to require their own
licenses for escorts who are licensed by another city, but who do business in their
City. R. 89.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 12, 2013, a Sandy City police officer noticed a BackPage.com
ad for adult entertainment. Tr. 7. He made arrangements to have Defendant meet him
in a Sandy hotel. Tr. 4. When Defendant arrived at the room, she asked for her "show
up fee" of $200. Tr. 6. After some small talk, she asked to use the bathroom to
change clothes, and she was cited for doing business as an escort in Sandy City
<@

without a Sexually Oriented Business (SOB) license. Tr. 9. Defendant performed no
services in Sandy City, other than walking to the room, and asking for her "show-up"
fee of$200. Tr. 8-9.

At the time of the incident, Defendant had such a license in

Midvale, a city directly north of Sandy, as an employee of The Doll House. R. 111,
113; Tr. 13.

Sandy City, in §§ 5-18-3 et seq., requires a city license for a sexually oriented
business, and also requires each employee to be individually licensed. Chapter 18
5

"Escort Agencies, Outcall Service Agencies, and semi-nude Dancing Agencies" § 518-5 requires an application, and supporting documentation:
b.3. Residence addresses for the past three years;
b.4. fingerprints;
b.6. employment history for five years:
b. 7. a detailed list of convictions of criminal activity, excepting minor
traffic offenses; and information on any pending criminal actions;
b.8. pending criminal charges. R. 59-60.
3. Escorts also must provide, under § 5-18-6:
a. two color photographs.
c. Certificate from Salt Lake City-County Health Department showing
that applicant is free from communicable disease. R. 60.
A licensing fee of $300 is required, according to a letter from the Sandy
Business License Administrator, received by counsel on May 6, 2014. (The fees
around the county are as high as $1,000). R. 105.
The Midvale Ordinance,§ 5.12.090 regarding licensing of Sexually Oriented
Business (SOB) employees mirrors that of Sandy:
D. Names used, business and residence addresses, driver license
number and social security number.

6
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F. Color photos and fingerprints.
G. Certificate from Salt Lake City-County Health Department showing
that applicant is free from communicable disease.
H. Employment history for three years.
I. Permit history, including any denials or revocations for last five years.
J. a detailed list of convictions of criminal activity, excepting minor
traffic offenses for the last five years; and information on any pending
criminal actions; R. 63.
~

License fees in Midvale total $175.00. R. 111.
The ordinances cited above are but two of the at least thirteen similar escort or
SOB ordinances enacted by the County and its subdivisions, each requiring
background checks, fingerprints and application fees.

R. 65. A list of similar

ordinances form various cities in Salt Lake County are contained in an Addendum to
this Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah District Court have repeatedly ruled that a city may not require a business
license of a business which is located in another city, but occasionally enters this city
on business. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5 specifically grants authority to cities to
single out licensed escorts for disparate treatment, requiring licenses in each of

7

several cities through which they may pass on business, a requirement not shared with
any other profession.

~

This statute thus is an unconstitutional infringement on

Defendant's First Amendment commercial speech rights.

It is also an

unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection of the Law, because it treats discriminates
against this profession in a way motivated by animus, and without a valid regulatory
interest.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN § § 10-8-41.5 VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S FIRST
AMENDMENT RlGHT TO FREE SPEECH, AND PARTICULARLY VIOLATES
THE RlGHT OF DEFENDANT TO COlVIJv1ERCIAL SPEECH.
Litigation over zoning of"adult" or "sexually oriented businesses" (SOB 's) has
a long history. Adult entertainment businesses have been recognized to have some
protection for their activities under the First Amendment, as protected expression.
At the time of the incident, Defendant was employed by The Doll House Escorts, an
entity which was expressly found to be protected under the First Amendment in a
Declaratory Judgment Action, Bushco v. Utah State Tax Commission, Third District
Court Civil No.040911691, on July 3, 2007:
The escort service Plaintiffs are entitled to First Amendment protection
8

~

@

because they incorporate dancing services; thus for purposes of these crossmotions all the Plaintiffs will be treated as if they are entitled to the same First
Amendment Protection. R. 1207.

@

In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) the Supreme Court affirmed that films
as a medium of communication are protected by the First Amendment, and that a
statute which allows prior restraint of such expression "comes to this Court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. Id. at 57. The Court also made
it clear that, in such cases, a person has standing to attack the validity of the law
"whether or not his conduct might be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and
whether or not he applied for a license." Id.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court
applied an "intermediate scrutiny" test with regard to ordinances which regulated the
location of adult businesses with regard to their "secondary effects" and "incidently"
affected the expression associated with it. The Court referred to such ordinances as

((@

"content-neutral" because the emphasis was not the content of the expression, but the
problems the businesses brought to the cities where they located, including increased
crime and decreased property values, which are said to occur in close proximity to
those businesses:
The District Court's finding as to "predominate" intent, left undisturbed
9

by the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the city's
pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. The ordinance, by its terms, is designed to prevent
crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and
generally 11 protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's]
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life, 11 not
to suppress the expression of unpopular views. See App. to Juris.
Statement 90a. As JUSTICE POWELL observed in American Mini
Theatres,
11

[i] f [the city] had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed
by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or restrict their
number, rather than circumscribe their choice as to location. 11
Sandy City argued below that this is properly reviewed as a "secondary effects"
case. All the cases cited by the City, including some cases which originated in Utah,
involved the same issues as in Young and Renton: the regulation of an establishment
whose presence in a specific place is alleged to pose a danger of "secondary effects"
in the immediate area. The City suggested that the licensing ordinance is a "content

<ii

neutral" regulation related to "Secondary Effects" associated with adult businesses.

It cited Young v. American Mini theaters, 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1996) and Renton as cases
supporting the doctrine of "secondary effects":
Further, municipalities may regulate the harmful secondary effects of a
sexually oriented business so long as it is done in a "content neutral"
manner, meaning the regulation is designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communications. See Renton v. Playtime theaters, Inc., 475
10

Gir;

US. at 47(1986). R. 79.
This doctrine does not apply to an escort service, or a single escort, who arrives
@

and departs a city in an hour or two, and does not have an effect on the surrounding
area. See Voyeur Dorm v. City of Tampa, Fl., 265 F.3d 1232 (11 th Cir. 2001) where
the Court disavowed "secondary effects" jurisprudence when the adult entertainment
facility was not in a specific place which was accessible to the public. The difference
here is that the business is located in another city, and only has incidental and isolated
contacts with Sandy. Like the business in Voyeur Dorm, customers do not come to
the business and congregate in the area. Thus, the interest of Sandy City is much less
compelling than in a case where the business is located in a specific location and
draws people from outside the area to it.
Without conceding that "intermediate scrutiny" is the appropriate level for
review of the statue at issue here, Defendant contends that such a level of scrutiny

<@

will not sustain this statute. The seminal authority for the application ofintermediate
scrutiny is United States. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where the the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that a general statute regulating behavior may incidentally
burden expression if:
1.

it is within the constitutional power of government to adopt;
11

2.

it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

3.

the interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and

4.

the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 376-7.

The Sandy ordinance, as applied to this Defendant, does not meet the
requirements of points 2, 3 and 4, above. The function of a licensing ordinance for
escorts is to prohibit those with criminal records from the profession, to avoid the
spread of disease, and to enable the city to locate a licensed person if there is an
allegation of misconduct. The Sandy Ordinance does not further an important city
interest, when observed in conjunction with the Midvale ordinance. Everything
which the Sandy ordinance is designed to accomplish has already been accomplished
by Midvale. Sandy is not being asked to give up enforcement of laws against
lewdness or sexual activity within the City. The application of this ordinance to
Defendant does indeed suppress expression; and it creates a greater restriction on
freedom than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
Sandy City, along with other cities in Salt Lake County, claims that the
licensing of escorts who might occasionally come into their city is necessary because
of the fear of possible prostitution activities. Obviously, the inability to require such
12

<i.iJ

~

regulatory licenses does not prevent the city from enforcing laws against prostitution.
Nevertheless, the city claims that the ability to license will make it easier to track

~

escorts, and to prevent unlawful conduct. It does not say how a full licensing
application in each city, as opposed to a simple license issued without fuss to
someone already licensed elsewhere would accomplish that. The law was enacted by
the legislature in 2010 at the specific request of the Salt Lake City police chief. Chief
Burbank testified before a legislative committee that there was a particular problem
in his city from the presence of escorts who were not licensed by any city, or had
obtained a general business license from a smaller city which did not have an Escort
or SOB ordinance. Thus, he claimed, there were escorts coming into his city who had
not been checked out by any city to determine whether they had criminal records or
might even have communicable diseases. Assuming that the chief had a valid
concern, it would not support the substantially overbroad grant of authority in the law

~

at issue here. Defendant has gone through an expensive, time consuming process in
Midvale to determine that she has no criminal history and is not a threat to carry

C,\

vii

communicable disease. What possible function does a law serve which requires her
to go through that same procedure multiple times in order to engage in her licensed
profession a few miles away? Does Sandy City really contend that they cannot obtain
13

any necessary information about an escort either by calling her agency (which is

~

required to be open when she is working) or the licensing authority in Midvale?
Defendant suggests that a Sandy City license could easily be issued to someone
who already holds a Midvale license, without the necessity of new investigations,
photos, health tests, etc., for a nominal fee. While such a license still is unnecessary,
it would eliminate the obvious barrier to obtaining multiple licenses. It would still
satisfy the interest of the City in determining that the licensee is properly qualified.
But the present system of requiring multiple licenses is not geared to the legitimate
interests of the City in determining qualifications. Instead, it is done with the clear
intent to make it so difficult to do business that nobody will do so. Under any
interpretation of "the O'Brien test", the licensing scheme fails.
The State law that gives each city this explicit right unlawfully interferes with,
and unlawfully taxes, First Amendment protected expression.

See again

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); and Staub v. City ofBaxley~ 355
U.S. 313 (1958). The City has made no serious attempt to justify the need for the
draconian effect exhibited here; and the city in its memorandum below did not even
discuss the licensing authority cited by Defendant in support of her contentions. The
City has not shown, and cannot show, deleterious effects on the city if this scheme
14

~

~

~

is not enforced.
The city licensing scheme, in conjunction with licensing schemes in 12 or

~

more nearby cities, works to erect a barrier of prohibition on constitutionally
protected activity. In FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. (1990) the Supreme Court
specifically prohibited licensing schemes regulating adult entertainment businesses,
which acted to promote prior restraint, and to effectively prohibit, through harassing
provisions, the exercise of First Amendment protected speech. The Ninth Circuit, in
Tallis v. San Bernardino County . 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) outlined the test
regarding the validity of "content neutral" regulations:
We agree that the County has a substantial interest in preventing the
deleterious secondary effects often associated with adult theaters. At a
minimum, however, there must be a logical relationship between the evil
feared and the method selected to combat it. (a regulation's "incidental
restriction on ... First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.") The County must show
that in enacting the particular limitations it places upon adult theaters,
it relied upon evidence permitting the reasonable inference that, absent
such limitations, the adult theaters would have harmful secondary
effects. 827 F.2d at 1332, 1333.
The requirement of multiple licensing as practiced here is surely not a good
faith effort at regulating the escort profession. The Seventh Circuit reviewed an adult
entertainment law containing similar licensing requirements for exotic dancers in

15

Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831 (7 th Cir. 2000). While it upheld portions
of the ordinance, it struck down some as well:
Yet we invalidate the required production of a residential address, recent
color photographs, social Security number, fingerprints, taxpayers
identification number and driver's license information. This information
is redundant and unnecessary for Cumberland's stated purposes. Its
required disclosure serves "no purpose other than harassment." Genusa,
619 F2d at 121 7, because it is not narrowly tailored to the government's
interests in the time, place or manner of adult entertainment. Id. at 852.
(Emphasis added).

Defendant's attack on the statute and ordinance here is not as broad as that in
Schultz. Defendant is not contending here that no city may require her to produce
photographs, personal information, fingerprints and a health certificate. But she does
contend that if at least 13 cities do so at once, the combined effect is both impossible
to comply with, and

serves "no purpose other than harassment."

It is the State

statute which specifically gives the City such power. Insofar as Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-41.5

authorizes the City to require the additional license and all the

requirements that go into applying for one, the statute violates Defendant's First
Amendment rights, and also Defendant's rights to Equal Protection of the Law under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
16

~

(.d)}

(1941) and in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1941), ruled that fees for
licenses for activities protected by the First Amendment must be "revenue neutral".
In Fly Fish v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d. 1301 (11 th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that nude exotic dancing was within the scope of these
rulings. It invalidated an adult entertainment licensing ordinance which charged fees
higher than the amount necessary to administer the licensing program. Any higher
amount, the Court said would effectively be "charging for the privilege of exercising
a constitutional right." While the City may argue that there is substantial cost
involved in administering the complicated licensing scheme, there need not be. It is
only because the licensing scheme insists on duplicative and burdensome procedures
that there is much of a cost at all. A scheme that would allow those licensed in other

(@

jurisdictions to get a local license with a minimum fee and no additional tests would
not unduly burden either the entertainer or the City administration. The alternative

~

is so simple, so easy, and so inexpensive. Thus, it cannot be seriously argued that the
incidental restriction of multiple licensing on First Amendment freedoms "is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of' of important governmental interests.
In the context of this case, it also seems obvious that the asserted interests of the City
are indeed related to the suppression of expression. There can be little doubt that the
17

City exhibits substantial ammus towards Defendant's profession, despite the

Giii;i

professed willingness to license it, if Defendant is willing to undergo the "trial by
ordeal" of 13 health tests, background checks and fees.

The Sandy City licencing

fee is $300, and Midvale only charges $175. Ifwe take the average of those two fees
(and other cities do charge more), yearly licensing fees alone (not including costs of
multiple health exams, background checks, etc.) is over $3,000. That is a substantial
and unnecessary burden on Defendant's free speech.
The Tenth Circuit Court, in Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d
1221 (10 th Cir. 2005) recently found a licensing scheme for door to door sales people,
who had no long term ties to the City, a violation of First Amendment commercial
speech rights. It affirmed an injunction prohibiting the City of Pleasant Grove, Utah
from requiring a license, a background check, photographs and other personal
information and fingerprints, and posting a bond as part of the licensing process.
Pacific Frontier was a distributor of Kirby vacuum cleaners. Because the
company determined that the costs of complying with the licensing ordinance for
sales people who were only in the City for a short time, was prohibitive, it refused to
comply, and commenced door to door sales without the licenses. When several of its
sales people were arrested, legal action was taken in Federal court claiming that the
18
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ordinance was a violation of the First Amendment commercial speech rights. In a
footnote, the Court noted that Pleasant Grove had been attempting to collect licensing

@

fees of $100 per week, instead of the $100 per year that was actually required in the
ordinance. Thus, the burden on the licensee was claimed to be prohibitive. The
Plaintiffs specifically sought an injunction against the annual fee, the bond and the
fingerprint requirements.

The police department cited concerns over thefts

committed by door to door sales people, as well as some reports of residential
burglaries after specific neighborhoods had been canvassed. The police did admit,
however, that the fingerprint information had never led to a refusal to issue a license,
nor had it aided in investigating a crime. Further testimony was that there was no
procedure to collect on the bond, and that no effort to so collect had ever been made.
The City maintained that the Plaintiffs had no standing to contest the law, as they had
made no effort to obtain the required license. The Court ruled that "applying for and
@

being denied a license or an exemption is not a requirement to challenge an
unconstitutional law", citing Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now v. Golden, 744 F.2d 739 (10 th Cir. 1984) 1 •

See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147
(1969).
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The Court set forth the standard for an ordinance which the City must meet in
order to defeat a challenge base on the First Amendment in a commercial speech case:
To defend a regulation against a First Amendment challenge, a
municipality must assert "a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech." Additionally, the restriction must
directly advance that substantial interest. If the regulation "provides
only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose," it will
not be upheld. Finally, the regulation is unconstitutional "if the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech," Pleasant Grove "must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree." (Internal citations omitted) 414
F.3d at 1231-32.
The court went on to say:
Pleasant Grove has also failed to show why state criminal laws are
inadequate to deter fraud, or why state tort law provides insufficient
relief to homeowners whose property may be inadvertently damaged.
Id. at 1232.
The Court disapproved ofthe requirement that sales people supply fingerprints,
citing the Supreme Court case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) as
upholding a requirement of supplying identification, but not fingerprint requirements.
It also cited Martin v. Strothers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943): "A government's power
to regulate solicitors, even through identification gathering, is of course, bounded by
the First Amendment."

20
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The State cannot authorize a city to violate First Amendment rights, nor can it
authorize a city to deny an individual the equal protection of the law. So, in the
@

instant case, the delegation of authority is the target because it specifically authorizes
cities to regulate business over which they normally would have no regulatory power,
and to violate the constitutional rights of those who have fully complied with the
licensing regulations of the City in which their business is located . The Court is
urged to review the effect of enforcing the Sandy ordinance as to whether it violates
the constitutional rights of Defendant. If the Pleasant Grove ordinance created
unconstitutional burdens on sales people who did only limited business in the City,
then certainly, the same is true of the Sandy City ordinance at issue here. And it is
the State which has overstepped its bounds in its attempt to delegate unconstitutional
authority to the city. The ordinance, as applied to a properly licensed escort from a
neighboring city amounts to harassment; and it creates an unfair and unequal burden

(d)

on Defendant in her constitutionally protected activities. The application of the
City's authority is invalid; and it is the state delegation of that power that is
unconstitutional .
Defendant concedes that if the State of Utah itself introduced a licensing
scheme for escorts, there would be some merit to it. Under such a scheme, only one
21

license, one set of fingerprints, one health test, and one background check would be
required. There is no "rational basis" for 13 cities in one county to require the kind
of repetitive licensing requirements that are sought here. There is no rational basis
for the City of Sandy to require escorts licensed in Midvale, and who have gone
through the same exhaustive and expensive list of requirements, to be licensed again.
The requirement is only "for the purposes of harassment; and that fails to meet the
0 'Brien standards.

POINT II
THE STATUTE AT ISSUE DENIES DEFENDANT THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
The power to license businesses is not inherent in a City, but must be
specifically granted by statute. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1985). The governing statute on the subject is Utah Code Ann.
§ I 0-1-203(2) which states:

Except as provided in Subsections (3) through 5, the governing body of
a municipality may license for the purpose of regulation and revenue any
business within the limits of the municipality and may regulate that
business by ordinance.
The act of driving into Sandy City for a meeting with another person does not
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constitute the commencement of a business in the City. Clearly, more must be present
for the business to exist in Sandy City and to be licensed there. Arranging to meet

(@)

with someone in the city for a fee does not meet this requirement. Sandy City does
not have the legislative power to require an someone to obtain a business license
under these circumstances. The rule is the same for any business. A plumber does
not have to be licensed in every city where he makes a call. Such a requirement
would force those occupations which require mobility to stay in one city, and likely
to go out of business. Neither does a delivery company, such as one of the Salt Lake
based businesses which run legal papers between law firms, need a license in every
place in which it makes deliveries. Florists, pizza delivery services and a myriad of
other services that cpome to our door are exempt from the requirements directed at
this Defendant. See Davis v. Ogden City . 215 P.2d 616 (Utah 1950) in which the
Supreme Court held that a City can license a legal professional, already licensed by

@

the State, for revenue purposes only, but only those whose offices are located in the
City. It is true that the Court held the matter of licensing out-of-city businesses for
another day, but seemed to preclude such a tax:
We reserve a discussion of the legal principles involved should Ogden
City seek to collect a license tax from lawyers not engaged in business
in that city. Facts have not been alleged which indicate that an attempt
23

is being made to license out of city attorneys and so we have assumed
that the ordinance will only be constitutionally applied to those members
of the profession who maintain offices or places of business within the
corporate limits of Ogden City. For the purpose of this action, Ogden
City concedes the ordinance cannot embrace attorneys whose place of
business is elsewhere than in that city. 215 P .2d at 624.

~

~

The matter seems to be settled that a municipality generally can only license
businesses whose place of business is located within its corporate limits. Cities may
claim that they will be inundated by businesses of which they do not approve.
Because of the right of free travel and the regulation of commerce by State and
Federal entities, that may be something that cities will have to grin and bear. In this
case, the inconvenience is small. The lack of authority to license an out-of-town
business does not mean that Sandy city must tolerate unlawful conduct, such as
prostitution, from outside businesses. If convicted of such a crime, a person can be
appropriately punished. She cannot, however, be licensed by every city through
which she may pass.
A requirement that a business have many licenses to work in a relatively small
area is not practical, and works only to prohibit, not actually license. This issue of
licensing in the context of escort licensing has been before the Third District Court
many times before, and the decision in each of those cases was in favor of the
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Defendant. See Cottonwood Heights v. Curtis, Third District Case No. 051904605;
Salt Lake City v. Warren, Third District Case No. 011914968; Salt Lake City v.

(@

Derian, Third District Case No. 021901122; Midvale City v. Turner, Third District
Court No. 081402051; and Layton City v. Franklin, Second District Case No.
051601326. In each of those cases, the District Court found that the City has only
the power to license businesses which are located in their city; and that an occasional
entry into the city by an escort licensed by another city, does not convey licensing
authority.
Thus, the Utah legislature passed a statute in 2010, Utah Code Ann. § 10-841.5, which allow cities to require their own licenses for an escort, who already is
licensed by a neighboring city, but who may occasionally enter their city for an
appointment. The same District Court that found against Defendant in this case
previously ruled that the City could not enforce its general business licencing

@

ordinance against an escort from another city, as the Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5
only applies to SOB ordinances, and does not grant general business licensing
authority. See Sandy City v. Dickinson, Third Dist. No. 121400713. R. 66. Thus, the
state statute singles out this one profession for treatment not allowed for any other
profession.
25

It should be remembered that undercover Sandy police specifically asked
Defendant to come to Sandy for an appointment. There is no evidence that she did
business there in any regular way. There is no suggestion that she violated any state

~

laws involving sex solicitation or other crimes. Defendant contends that this statute,
which singles out a particular licensed profession for special treatment, and which
would require at least 13 separate licenses in order to do business throughout the
county, violates Defendant's right to the Equal Protection ofthe Law. The delegation
of authority at issue here is invalid because it delegates authority which can only be
used to harass Defendant and to deny her Equal protection of the Law. Though
Defendant is not charged with violation of the state statute, it is being used by the
City to show that it now has authority to regulate and license an escort who may only
come into the City on a rare occasion, and stay only a brief time. It is the City which
will use its "police power" to extract unlawful compliance from Defendant, and
which will benefit from either licensing fees or fines for nonpayment of those fees.
It is the City which will require fingerprints and a health test for an entry into the city
which may last only an hour, and which may not be repeated for a period of months.
But it is the State statute which purports to grant that power to the City; and it is the
State statute which thus ultimately infringes on Defendant's constitutional rights
26
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under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) the U.S. Supreme Court struck down

@

a Colorado constitutional amendment which prohibited cities and counties from
enacting laws which protected gays and lesbians from discrimination, as a violation
of Equal Protection of the Law. The Court had the following to say about the effort:
The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity
that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting
disadvantage to various groups or persons. We have attempted to
reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold
the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.
Amendment 3 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First,
the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and,
as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Id. at 632.
The Court went on to say:
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected. "If the constitutional
conception of' equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 634.
The primary purpose the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for
other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of
landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to
27

homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources
to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the
amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we
find it impossible to credit them.
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else. This Colorado cannot do. Id. at 63 5. (Internal citations omitted)
(Emphasis in original).
Defendant here contends that the state statute granting power to a myriad of
cities to simultaneously license her profession makes her and others in her profession
unequal to everyone else. And most assuredly, "the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected." Thus the law deprives Defendant
and others of her class, the Equal Protection of the Law to which they are
constitutionally entitled. Because Defendant is licensed to perform a service under
strict regulation, but then is prohibited from doing so by a licensing scheme that
amounts to a barrier to her profession, she is denied Equal Protection, and the State
statute is invalid.
CONCLUSION
The State statute specifically allows cities to license this particular profession,
as opposed to all others in the State, in such a way as to constitute a prohibition.
Thus, it violates Defendant's First Amendment rights; and it denies Defendant the
28
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Equal Protection of the Law. The statute is unconstitutional, and it should be
stricken.

•

DATED this /{ day of May, 2015 .
W.AND
~

•

-

W. An rew McCullough

Attorney for Appellant
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for Appellee, 10000 Centennial Pkwy., Sandy, UT 84111; and also to Laura Dupaix,
Deputy Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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VAN MIDGLEY 5000
DOUGLAS A JOHNSON 8779
Sandy City Attorney's Office
10000 Centennial Parkway
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 568-7170
Fax: (801) 568-7177
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT -WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
FELICIA JOYCE ANDERSON
1931 S 1170 W
Woods Cross, UT 84087
DOB: 12/18/1988
Police Report#: 13£008374
Justice Court Case#: 131001437
Defendant.

INFORMATION

CASE NO. 131401516
Judge Barry Lawrence
OTN#:

The plaintiff, Sandy City, hereby charges that the defendant, committed within its jurisdiction, the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1: SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESS LICENSE REQUIRED, in violation of Utah State Code
5-18-3, a(n) Class B Misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about September 12, 2013, at 270 W SEGO LILY
DR, Sandy, Utah, did It is unlawful for any person to operate an agency, be employed by an agency, or perform
escort or outcall services, within the City, without first obtaining a valid license from the business license
authority.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): Officer T Davis 184.
Authorized December 26, 2013
for presentment and filing:
@

By

~~~-City Prosecor

0000033

___..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing INFORMATION by United States First
Class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant
6885 South State Street, #200
Midvale UT 84047

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-WEST JORDAN
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD RD
WEST JORDAN,UT 84088

This December 26, 2013

Diane Story
Sandy City Attorney's Office
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEP ARTl\.1ENT

Wes
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JIJL 1l .,. couflr

. 2014

TJORDAN

DEp,:

-------------------------------SANDY CITY,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 131401516
(Also Filed in Case No. 131401513)

FELICIA ANDERSON,

Judge Barry G. Lawrence

Defendant.

THIS MATIER is before the Court on Defendant Felicia Anderson's Motion to Dismiss. 1
The parties briefed the issues and the Court heard argument on March 24, 2014. The Court then
requested supplemental briefing from the parties, which was completed on May 20, 2014. Having
reviewed the record and considering the argwnents of counsel, the Court now issues the following
Decision. 2

Background and Procedural Posture
Defendant is charged with violating Sandy City Ordinance 5-18-3 (the Sandy Ordinance),
which provides that: "It is unlawful for any person to operate an agency, be employed by an agency,

1

The same motion was advanced by defendant Micaela Lawless, Case No. 131401513

2

Neither party filed the requisite Notice to Submit for Decision following the
supplemental briefing. Accordingly, the Court was never notified that the matter was ready for a
decision; otherwise, this Order would have been issued sooner.
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or perform escort or outcall services, within the City, without first obtaining a valid license from the
business license authority." The Sandy Ordinance is authorized by Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-41.5 (the
State Statute)3 and is one of thirteen similar ordinances in Salt Lake County that requires escorts to
obtain a license before working in the subject municipality. It is undisputed that Defendant is
licensed as an escort in Midvale City - one of the thirteen municipalities that require escorts to
obtain a license before working in the city- and that Midvale City's escort licensing requirements
are substantially similar to Sandy City's. It is also undisputed, at least for purposes of the pending
motion, that Defendant was performing escort services in Sandy City without a Sandy City license.
In her initial memorandum, Defendant seemed to be challenging the constitutionality of the
State Statute, which grants municipalities authority to enact local ordinances such as the Sandy
Ordinance. (See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 6 ("Defendant contends that [the State
Statute], which singles out a particular licensed profession for special treatment, and which would
require at least 13 separate licenses in order to do business throughout the county, violates the Utah
and U.S. Constitutions.").) After oral argument, the Court issued a Minute Entry requesting
additional briefing from the parties relevant to the inquiry whether the State Statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the Defendant. Because it was unclear to the Court whether the
analysis should be from the perspective of the State's interest or the City's interest, the Court invited
the parties to address whether the Court should analyze the State's interest or the City's interest, or
both, and what those interests were. The Court also asked Defendant to provide support for her

3

The State Statute provides, in relevant part, that "(a] person employed in a sexually
oriented business may not work in a municipality: (a) if the municipality requires that a person
employed in a sexually oriented business be licensed individually; and (b) if the person is not
licensed by the mW1icipality." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5(2).
-2-
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argument that the Sandy City licensure process was identical to Midvale City's. Finally, the Court
noted that the State Statute at issue did not itself require the Defendant to do anything, nor did it
prevent the Defendant from doing anything, and invited the parties to submit legal authority whether
an as applied challenge can be maintained under such circumstances.
The parties each submitted supplemental memoranda. Defendant provided support for the
similarity between the Sandy and Midvale ordinances4 and the City reiterated its interest in having
the Sandy Ordinance. The Defendant, however, shifted her challenge from the State Statute to the
Sandy Ordinance. (See Def. 's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 6 ("The Court is
urged to review the Sandy ordinance as to whether it violates the constitutional rights of
Defendant."). Defendant now asserts that the Sandy Ordinance violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and their Utah Constitution counterparts. However,
despite passing references to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Utah State Constitution,
Defendant's briefing and argument focuses exclusively on the First Amendment of the United States

4

The Sandy Ordinance requires applicants to pay a $300 fee and provide the following
information: (I) date of birth; (2) addresses for previous three years; (3) complete set of
fingerprints; (4) height, weight, eye color, hair color; (5) employment history for previous five
years; and (6) detailed criminal history for previous ten years, including pending charges.
Applicants must also provide two color photographs, the name and address of the applicant's
employer, and a certificate from the Salt Lake City-County Health Department stating that the
applicant is free of any contagious or communicable diseases.
Midvale City Ordinance 5 .12. 080 requires applicants to pay a $17 5 fee and provide the
following information: ( 1) any other names or aliases; (2) age, date and place of birth; (3) height,
weight, eye color, hair color; (4) present business and residence addresses; (5) Utah driver's
license or identification number; (6) social security munber; (7) proof of required minimum age;
(8) employment history for previous years; (9) license or permit history for previous five years;
and (10) detailed criminal history for previous five years. Applicants must also provide two color
photographs, fingerprints and a certificate from the Salt Lake Valley health department stating
that the applicant is free of any contagious or communicable diseases.
-3-
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Constitution. Defendant fails to explain the basis for her Fourteenth Amendment challenge and,
therefore, the Court declines to consider it. See Hill v. Superior Property Management Services,

1nc., 2013 UT 60, ,r 47, 321 P.3d 1054 ("Like an appellate court, a district court 'is not a depository
in which [a party] may dwnp the burden of argument and research."' (quoting Allen v. Friel, 2008
UT 56, 19, 194 P.3d 903)). Moreover, because Defendant has failed to separately analyze the state
constitutional provisions or explain why the state constitution provides greater protection than its
federal counterpart, the Court declines to consider a separate challenge on state constitutional
grounds. See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 2011 UT 81 (declining to consider separate state constitutional
challenge that was inadequately briefed). Accordingly, the Court considers only Defendant's
challenge to the Sandy Ordinance under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Constitutional Analysis
"'[L]egislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional,' and 'those who challenge a
statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality."'

State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ,r 42 (quoting Greenwoodv. City ofN. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816,819
(Utah 1991)). The parties agree that the Sandy Ordinance is a "content neutral" regulation that
imposes only an incidental burden on speech and, therefore, is subject to "intermediate scrutiny"
pursuant to the framework set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). "Under

O'Brien, a regulation of conduct is constitutional and must be upheld so long as: (1) it is within the
power of the legislature to enact; (2) it furthers a substantial government interest; (3) the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of protected expression; and ( 4) any incidental restrictions
it imposes on protected expression are not greater than is essential to further the interest." Bushco
v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73,125,225 P.3d 153 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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Here, Defendant focuses her argument on the fourth factor in the O 'Brien framework. She
concedes that Sandy City is authorized by the State Statute to enact the Sandy Ordinance and that
licensing escorts - at least in the abstract - furthers a substantial government interest. Similarly,
Defendant does not allege that the government interest is related to the suppression of protected
expression. Instead, Defendant argues that the Sandy Ordinance imposes restrictions that are greater
than are necessary to further the City's interest. Specifically, Defendant argues that "after she has
gone through [the extensive licensing requirements] in a neighboring city, the requirement that she
do it all over again [in Sandy City] is indeed 'for no other purpose than harassment."' (Def.' s Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 10.)
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bushco is instructive. There, a group of escort service
agencies and erotic dancing clubs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop enforcement of a
state tax that applied only to certain sexually oriented businesses. The plaintiffs challenged the tax
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, arguing that the tax impermissibly
restricted their freedom of speech. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax
Commission, holding the tax constitutional under O'Brien, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

In analyzing the fourth O'Brien factor, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Finally, the Tax satisfies the fourth prong of the O'Brien test as well, in that the
burdens that the Tax places on protected expression are no greater than necessary.
Although the Supreme Court's use of the "no greater than necessary" language in
0 'Brien appears similar to the "least restrictive means" requirement for strict
scrutiny, the Court has made clear that this prong does not require the state to show
that its chosen means for advancing the substantial state interest is the least restrictive
means available. Instead, the fourth prong of the O'Brien test imposes only a
requirement that the regulation be "narrowly tailored," in the sense that it "promote[]
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." De minimis impacts on protected speech are permissible.
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Plaintiffs argue that the Tax fails this prong because there are less burdensome ways
of addressing the state's interest in providing treatment for sex offenders and that the
First Amendment requires that these methods, rather than the Tax, be used.
To begin with, Plaintiffs' argument suggests that O'Brien requires a regulation of
conduct placing incidental burdens on some protected expression to use the least
restrictive means available to serve the state's asserted interest. The Supreme Court
has expressly rejected that formulation of the O'Brien test. Additionally, Plaintiffs'
least restrictive means argument is contrary to its own position that a general
tax-one that burdens all businesses-would satisfy First Amendment scrutiny under
0 'Brien. A generalized tax would no doubt inflict burdens on a greater variety of
protected expression than the Tax at issue here, and therefore would not be the least
restrictive means available. The Supreme Court's cases have made clear that the
fourth prong of O'Brien is satisfied so long as a content-neutral regulation "promotes
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.'' Further, de minimis impacts on protected expression are permissible.
Bushco, 2009 UT 73, ,I,I 39-41, 225 P.3d 153 (internal citations omitted).

Like the plaintiffs in Bushco, Defendant complains that the Sandy Ordinance is not the least
restrictive means to serve the City's stated interests. Presumably, where an escort is licensed in
another municipality, the City's interests could be served by having the escort simply file proof of
compliance rather than duplicating the licensing requirements. Defendant principally relies on
Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221 (10 th Cir. 2005).

In Pacific Frontier, a group of door-to-door solicitors challenged on First Amendment
grounds a city ordinance that required individuals to obtain a license before engaging in door-to-door
sales. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of three provisions of the ordinance: the annual
fee, bond and fingerprint requirements. The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction and Pleasant Grove City appealed. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court. In doing so, the court noted the "deferential standard" that an appellate court
employs when reviewing a lower court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1231. And,
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given the posture of the case, the l 0th Circuit only decided that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits. Moreover, and most
importantly, Pacific Frontier did not involve application of the O'Brien framework, which the
parties here agree is the proper standard. According! y, the Court determines that Defendant's reliance
on Pacific Frontier is misplaced.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bushco, an ordinance "is not invalid simply because
there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. The validity of
[content neutral regulations of conduct] does not tum on a judge's agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government
interests." Id. at 1 42 (quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Here, Defendant
argues that a license issued by one municipality should be good for all municipalities. Inherent in
that argument is that Sandy City should be required to either coordinate its licensure efforts with
other municipalities or rely on another municipality's application and enforcement procedure. The
Court has been presented with no authority, and is aware ofno authority, that would impose such
a requirement on Sandy City. And, the above-quoted language from Bushco seems to indicate just
the opposite.

In sum, while the Court can understand Defendant's perception that this licensing scheme
is harassing, her concerns should be voiced to the state legislature, which could amend the State
Statute to enable escorts to work throughout the state with a single license.

-7-
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Sandy Ordinance passes muster under
the intermediate scrutiny framework set forth in O'Brien (and Bushco.) Accordingly, Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
No further Order is necessary.

So ORDERED this

J1

111
day of July, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 131401516 by the method and on the date
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/s/ LISA MUNK

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUMC
Sandy City Sexually Oriented Business
Ordinance.

any service fee is not paid within ninety duys of the due date, an add!tional
penalty of ten dollars shall be added lo each one hundred-dollar service fee so
unpaid, for a total penalty of thirty dollars. If any service fee is not paid within
one hundred twenty days of the due date together with all applicable penalties, the
City may use such lawful means as are available to collect such fee, including all
penalties, costs and attorneys' fees.

Appeal Procedure.

5-17-16.

(a)
Any alarm user may appear before the alarm coordinator and present
and contest the assessment of any penalty. The burden to prove any matter shall
be upon the person raising such matter.
(b)
If the alarm coordinator finds that no violation of this chapter
occurred, or that a violation occurred but one or more of the defenses set forth in
this section is applicable, the alarm coordinator may dismiss the penalty and
release the alarm user from liability there under, or may reduce the penalty
associated therewith as he or she shall determine. Such defenses are:
( J)
The false alarm for which the penalty has been assessed did not
originate at the premises of the alarm user who has been assessed the penalty.
(2)
The alarm for which the penalty has been assessed was, in fact, not
false, but was rather the result of an actual or attempted burglary, robbery, or
other emergency.
(3)
The police dispatch office was notified by the permit holder or the
alarm business that the alarm was false prior to the arrival of a police officer to
the alarm site in response to the false alarm; or
(4)
Such other mitigating circumstances as may be approved by the City
law department.
(c)
If the alarm coordinator finds that a false alarm did occur and no
applicable defense exists, the alarm coordinator may, in the interest ofjustice and
on behalf of the City, enter into an agreement for the timely or periodic payment
of the applicable penalty.
(d)
Any decision made by the alarm coordinator under this section may be
appealed to the Chief of Police.
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5-18-1.

Affected Business.

The Sandy City ("City") Council finds that esco1i ~genci~s, outcall service age_ncies, and ~eminude dancing agencies seriously affect the economic, social and moral well bemg of tl~e city and
its residents, that such businesses must be regulated strictly for the welfare of the pub he, and that
such businesses must therefore comply with this chapter.

5-18-2.

Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter the following words shall have the following meanings:
"Agency" means an escort agency, outcall service agency, or a semi-nude dancing agency.
"Business License Authority" means the business license section of the City's Community
Development department.
"Escort" means a person who, for pecuniary compensation, dates, socializes, visits, consorts with
or accompanies or offers to date, consort, socialize, visit or accompany another or others to or
about social affairs, entertainment or places ofamusement or within any place of public or
private resort or any business or commercial establishment or any private quarters. "Esco1i" shall
not be construed to include persons who provide business or personal services such as licensed
private nurses, aides for the elderly or handicapped, social secretaries or similar service
personnel ( l) whose relationship with their patron is characterized by a bona fide contractual
relationship having a duration of more than twelve (12) hours or (2) who provide a service not
principally characterized as dating or socializing. "Escort" shall also not be construed to include
persons providing services such as singing telegrams, birthday greetings or similar activities
characterized by appearances in a public place, contracted for by a party other than the person for
whom the service is being performed and of a duration of not longer than one (l) hour.
"Escort agency" means any person who, for a fee, commission, hire, or profit, furnishes or
arranges for escorts to accompany other persons for social engagements.
"OutcalJ service agency,, means any person which furnishes, books, or otherwise engages or
offers to furnish, book or otherwise engages outcall services.
"Outcall services" means services performed for pecuniary compensation and of a type generally
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performed within a sexually oriented business but performed outside of the premises of the
sexually oriented business. Outcall services arc prohibited in public places.
"Person" means any individual, agency, firm, unincorporated association, corporation,
partnership or other legal entity. For purposes of this chapter, a person who operates an agency
also includes each officer, director and shareholder owning IO% of the stock or beneficial
ownership if the agency is a corporation, and each partner, including limited pa11ners, if the
agency is a partnership.
"Public places" means any location within the City frequented by the public, or where the public
is present or likely to be present: or where a person may reasonably be expected to be observed
by members of the public.
"Semi-nude dancing agency" means any person which furnishes, books, or otherwise engages or
offers to furnish, book or o~herwise engage the service of a professional dancer for performance
or appearance at a sexually oriented business.

5-18-3.

License Reg uired.

lt is unlawfi.tl for any person to operate an agency, be employed by an agency, or perform escort
or outcall services, within the City, without first obtaining a valid license from the business
license authority.

5-18-4.

Zoning.

It is unlawful for any agency to do business at any location within the City not zoned for such
business. Agencies shall not be permitted as a home occupation.

5-18-5.

License Application; Disclosure.

AIJ persons applying for any !icense required under this chapter shall:

a.
b.

Pay the required fee.
File a written application with the business license authority on a form to be provided by
the business license authority to include the following as applicable:
I)
the complele name of each person, including the date and state of
incorporation,
2)
the date of birth,
3)
the complete residence and business address, not by post office box, and
previous residence and business addresses for a period of 3 years immediately
prior to the date of application,
4)
a complete set of fingerprints,
5)
height, weight, color of eyes, color of hair 1
6)
business, occupation or employment history for 5 years immediately
preceding the date of application including, but not limited to, whether such
person previously operated under any permit or license in another city in this state
or another state and whether any such permit or license had ever been suspended
or revoked,
7)
any convictions, including pleas of guilty or nolo contendre in any state or
federal court within the past 10 years, including municipal ordinance violations,
exclusive of traffic violations, with a brief statement of the nature of the
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convictions and the jurisdiction in which the convictions occurred,
8)
any pending cri1ninal charges in any state or federal court, with a brief
statement of the nature of the pending charges and the jurisdiction in which the
charges are pending,
9)
the name and address of persons who will have custody of the business
records at the business location,
I 0)
the n~me and address of the person who will be the agent for service of
process,
11)
a description of the nature and scope of the proposed business or services.

5-18-6.

Additional License Requirements to Perform Escort or Outcall
Services.

Jn addition to the requirements under section 5 of this chapter, alJ persons performing escort or
outcall services shall provide to the business license authority:
a.
Two passport-size color photographs at least one inch by one inch taken within 3 months
of the date of application.
b.
The name and address of the business, if any, at which the applicant is currently working
or at which the applicant expects to be employed.
c.
A certificate from the Salt Lake City-County Health Department, stating that the
applicant has: within 30 days immediately preceding the date of the app]ication, been
examined and found to be free of any contagious or communicable disease.

5-18-7.

License Fees.

The initial license and annual renewal fees for any license required under this chapter shall be as
set by resolution passed by the Sandy City Council.

5-18-8.
a.

Granting of License: Revocation, Suspension.

The business license authority may refuse to grant any license and may suspend, revoke
or refuse to renew any license issued under this chapter if it finds:
t)
The applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age or any higher age, if the
license sought requires a higher age.
2)

The required fee(s) have not been paid.

3)

The application does not conform in all respects to this chapter.

4)
The applicant has knowingly made a material misstatement in the
application.

5)
The agency or the services as proposed by the person would not comply
with all applicable local, state and federal laws, including but not limited to the
city's building and zoning regulations.
6)
The per~on has had on agency license or permit or service license or
permit or other similar license or permit revoked or suspended in this state or any
other state with in 3 years prior lo the c.latc of application.
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. _7.)_ _____ ..Th~_per_son_l:rns al the time of the application a pending criminal charge, or

within 5 years prior to tl1cdate o-f appffcritio11·has·be-ei1 ·coiivictecror,naspted · · ·
guilty or nolo contenderc to, any specified criminal activity as defined under
Sandy City Ordinance 12-2-1 et seq. or any offense involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, robbery, the use or threatened use of force or violence upon the person of
this state or any other state.
8)
The person, if a corporation, is not licensed to do business or is not in
good standing in the state of Utah.
b.

9)
For good cause shown.
Before a license may be suspended or revoked, the business license authority shall afford
the person an oppoitunity for a hearing to show cause why such license should not be
suspended or revoked.

5-18-9.
a.

License Limitations.

Each license sha11 remain valid from the date of issuance through January 1st of each
succeeding year unless otherwise suspended or revoked. Such license may be
renewed only by making c1 new application and payment of a fee as provided in
section 5 and section 7. The license foes shall not be prorated for any portion of a
year but shall be paid in fiill for whatever po1tion of the year the license is applied
for. Application for renewal should be made at least thirty (30) days before the
expiration date, and when made less than thirty (30) days before the expiration
date, the expiration of the license will not be affected.

b.

C.

d.

e.

Any change in the information required to be submitted for any license required under
this ordinance shaJ1 be given, in writing, to lhe business license authority within fourteen
days after such change.
Any license granted under this chapter shall not be transferable.
Each application for an agency license under this chapter sha1l post with the business
license authority a cash or corporate surety bond payable to Sandy City Corporation in
the amount of two thousand dollars. Each application to perform escort or outcall services
under this chapter shall post with the business license uuthority a cash or corporate surety
bond payable to Sandy City Corporation in the amount of five hundred dollars. Any fines
assessed for violations of City ordinances shall be taken from this bond if not paid in cash
within ten ( I 0) days after notice of the fine unless an appeal is filed as provided by this
chapter. In the event that funds are drawn against the cash or surety bond to pay such
fines the bond shall be replenished to two thousand dollars within fifteen days of the date
of notice of any draw against it.
It is unlawful for any agency to fail to display the license granted pursuant to this
ordinance in a prominent location within the business premises. It shall be unlawful for
any individual licensed pursuant to this ordinance to fail to, at all times while engaged in
licensed activities within the corporate boundaries of the city, carry their license on their
person. When requested by police, City licensing or other enforcement personnel or
health official, it is unlawful to foil to show the appropriate licenses while engaged in
licensed activities within the corporate boundaries of the City.
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It is unlawful to conduct business under a license issued pursuant to this ordinance at any
location other than the licensed premises. Any location to which telephone calls are
automatically forwarded by said business shall require a separate license. It is unlawful
to do business under any name other than the business name specified in the application.

5-18-10.

Operational Restrictions for Escort and Outcall Services.

All persons licensed pursuant lo this chapter shall:

a.

b.

C.

Provide to each patron a written conlracl in rcceipl of pecuniary compensation for escort
or outcall services. The contrnct shall clearly state the type of services to be performed,
the length of time such services shall lost, the cost to the patron and any special terms or
conditions relating to the services performed. The contract need not include the name of
the patron. The person shall keep and maintain a copy of each such written contract for a
period not less than one year from the date of provision of services thereunder. The
contracts shall be numbered and entered into a register listing the contract number, date,
names of all employees involved in the contract and pecuniary compensation paid.
Maintain an open office or telephone, regardless of the primary location of the business,
at which the person's designated agent, may be personally contacted during all hours
such services are being provided. The address and phone number of the office location
shall appear and be included in all patron contracts and published advertisements.
Permit the police department, or other City ofiicial, to have access at all times to all
premises licensed or applying for a license under this chapter and to make periodic
inspection of said premises.

5-18-11.

Violations; Penalties.

In addition to revocation or suspension ofa license, each violation of this chapter shall, upon
citation by the business license authority, require the person lo pay a civil penalty in the amount
of $500.00, to be deducted from the cost bond required pursuant to this chapter. In addition to
any civil fines, the violation of any provision of this ordinance shall be a class B misdemeanor.
Each day of violation shall be considered a separate offense. In addition to the civil and criminal
penalties provided herein, any person who violates any provision of this chapter is subject to a
suit for injunction and any other remedy available at law or in equity.

5-18-12.
a.

b.

Applicabilitv to Existing Regulations.

The provisions of this ordinance shall be applicable to al1 persons described herein
whether the herein-described activities were established before or after the effective date
of this chapter and regardless of whether such persons are currently licensed to do
business in the City. All such persons shall have forty-five days from the effective date of
this chapter, or until thei1· current license expires, whichever is first in time, to comply
with the provisions of this chapter.
Except where the context or specific provisions require, this ordinance does not
supersede or nullify any other City ordinance.

5-18-13.

Severa bility.

DOfJ0-062

ADDENDUMD
Midvale City Sexually Oriented Business
Ordinance.

8. In the event of a contract for nude modeling or appearance signed more than forty-eight hours in advance of the
modelin,J or appearance, the individual to appear nude shall not be required to obtain a license pursuant to this chapter.
During such unlicensed nude appearance, it is unlawful to:
1. Appear nude or seminude in the presence of persons under the age of eighteen;
2. Allow, offer or agree to any touching of the contracting party or other person by the individual appearing nude;
3. Allow, offer or agree to commit prostitution, solicitation of prostitution. solicitation of a minor, or committing activities
harmful to a minor;
·
4. APow, offer, commit or agree to any sex ad as validly defined by city ordinances or state statute;
5. Ahow, offer, agree or permit the contracting party or other person to masturbate in the presenre of the individual
contracted to appear nude;
6. Allow. offer or agree for the individual appearing nude to be within five feet of any other person while perfom1ing or
while nude or seminude. (Ord. 10/28/20030-12 (part). 2003: Ord. 11-22-88A § 6, 1988)

~

<11.J

5.12.070 Business categories--Number of licenses.
A. It is unlawful for any business premises to operate or be licensed for more than one category of sexually oriented
business, except that a business may have a license for both outcall services and nude and seminude dancing agency on
the same premises.
B. Thu categories of sexually oriented businesses are: outcall services, adult businesses. nude entertainment
businessE?S, seminude dancing bars, nude and seminude dancing agency. (Ord. 10/28/20030-12 (part), 2003: Ord. 11-2288A § 7. ·1988)

~

5.12.080 Employee licenses.
It is urnawful for any sexualfy oriented business to employ, or for any individual to be employed by a sexually oriented
business in the capacity of a sexually oriented business employee, unless that employee first obtains a sexually oriented
business Bmployee license. (Ord. 10/28/20030-12 (part), 2003: Ord. 11-22-88A § 8 1 1988)

5.12.09(1 License-Application-Disclosures required.
Before any applicant may be licensed to operate a sexually oriented business or as a sexually oriented business
employee pursuant to this chapter, the applicant shall submit. on a form to be supplied by the city license official, the
following:
A. The correct legal name of each applicant, corporation, partnership, limited partnership or entity doing business
under an assumed name;
8. If th1~ applicant is a corporation, partnership or limited partnership, or individual or entity doing business under an
assumed name, the information required below for individual applicants shall be submitted for each partner and each
principal of an applicant, and for each officer, director and any shareholder (corporate or personal) of more than ten
percent of the stock of any applicant. Any holding company, or any entity holding more than ten percent of an applicant,
shall be considered an applicant for purposes of disclosure under this chapter.
C. All corporations, partnerships or noncorporate entities included on the application shall also identify each individual
authorized by the corporation, partnership or noncorporate entity to sign the checks for such corporation. partnership or
noncorporate entity:
D. For E1II applicants or individuals, the application must also state:
1. Any other names or aliases used by the individual;
2. The age, date and place of birth;
3. Height and weight;
.._;
a·.t
4. Coro· of hair and eyes;
I . ~5. Pres,:mt business address. not to indude post office box, and telephone number.
6. Pre-Si?nt residence, not to include post office box, and telephone number,
7. Utah driver's license or identification number;
8. Sociill Security number,
E. Acceptable written proof that any individual is at least eighteen years of age or, in the case of employees to be
employed in businesses where a different age is required. proof of the required age:
F. Attached to the form as provided above, two color photographs of the applicant ciear1y showing the individual's face
and the individuals fingerprints on a form provided by the city police department. For persons not residing in the city the
photographs and fingerprints shall be on a form from the law enforcement jurisdiction where the person re~O.()=Q;~63
the photographs and fingerprints shall be paid by the applicant directly to the issuing agency;

t..~~r-u: 'T 8
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G. :=or an individual to obtain a sexually oriented business employee license as an escort. or as a nude entertainer.
shall pro1,.,ide a certificate from the Salt Lake Valley health department stating that the individual has. within thirty days
immedialE!ly preceding the date of the application, been examined and found to be free of any contagious or
communic:able diseases:
H. A statement of the business, occupation or employment history of the applicant for three years immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the application;
I. A statement detailing the license or permit history of the applicant for the five-ye!3r period immediately preceding the
date of th1? filing of the application, including whether such applicant previously operating or seeking to operate. in this or
any other county, city, state or tenitory, has ever had a license. permit or authorization to do business denied. revoked or
suspende<1. or has had any professional or vocational license or pennit denied, revoked or suspended. In the event of any
such denial. revocation or suspension. state the date, the name of the issuing or denying jurisdiction, and state in full !he
reasons for the denial, revocation or suspension. A copy of any order of denial, revocation or suspension shall be
attached to the application;
J. All ciiminal convidions or pleas of nolo contendre. except those which have been expunged, and the disposition of
all such arrests for the applicant. individual or other entity subject to disclosure under this chapter. for five years prior to
the date of the application. This disclosure shall inciude identification of all ordinance violations. excep1ing minor traffic
offenses (any traffic offense designated as a felony shall not be construed as a minor traffic offense). stating the date.
place, nat:Jre of each conviction or plea of nolo contendre, and sentence of each convidion or other disposition:
identifying the convicting jurisdiction and sentencing court; and providing the court identtfying case numbers or docket
numbers. Application for a sexually oriented business employee license shall constitute a waiver of disclosure of any
criminal conviction or plea of nolo contendre for the purposes of any proceeding involving the business or employee
license:
K. In the event the applicant is not the owner of record of the real property upon which the business or proposed
business· i.s or is to be located, the application must be accompanied by a notarized statement from the legal or equitable
owner of the possessory interest in the property specifically acknowledging the type of business for which the applicant
seeks a lic:mse for the property. In addition to furnishing such notarized statement. the applicant shall furnish the name.
address and phone number of the owner of record of the property, as well as the copy of the lease or rental agreemenl
pertaining to the premises in which the service is or will be located;
L. A description of the services to be provided by the business, with sufficient detail to allow reviewing authorities to
detennine what business will be transacted on the premises, together with a schedule of usual fees for seNices to be
charged by the licensee, and any rules. regulations or employment guidelines under or by which the business intends to
operate. This description shall also include:
1. The hours that the business or seNice will be open to the public, and the methods of promoting the health and
safety of th,~ employees and patrons and preventing them from engaging in illegal activity:
2. The methods of supeNision preventing the employees rrom engaging in acts of prostitution or other related criminal
activijies:

3. The methods of supervising employees and patrons to prevent employees and patrons from charging or receiving
fees for services or acts prohibrted by this chapter or other statutes or ordinances;
4_ The methods of screening employees and customers in order to promote the health and safety of employees and
customers and prevent the transmission of disease, and prevent the commission of acts of prostitution or other criminal
activity. (Ont 10/28/20030-12 (part). 2003: Ord. 11·22--88A § 9, 1988)

5.12.110 License-Bond.
Each api:;licalion for a sexually oriented business license shall post with the city's licensing official a cash or corporate
surety bond payable to Midvale City Corporation in the amount of two thousand dollars. Any fines assessed against the
business. officers or managers for violations of city ordinances shall be taken from this bond if not paid in cash within ten
days after notice of the fine. unless an appeal is filed as provided by this chapter._ln the event the funds are drawn against
the cash or :;urety bond to pay such fines the bond shall be replenished to two thousand dollars within fifteen days of the
date of notice of any draw against rt. (Ord. 10/28/20030-12 (part), 2003: Ord. 11-22-BBA § 11, 1988)

5.12.120 License-Premises location and name.
A. II is unlawful to conduct business under a license issued pursuant to this chapter
licenseo premises. Any location to which telephone calls are automatically forwarded by
separate license.
B. It is unlawful for any sexually oriented business to do business in the city under any
name specified in the applie<1tion. (Ord. 10/28/20030·12 (part). 2003: Ord. 11-22-88A § 12,

at any location other than the
such business shall require a
name other than lhe business
1988)
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ADDENDUME
List of other City Sexually Oriented Business
Ordinances.

0

SALT LAKE COUNTY SOB ORDINANCES
@

I. Draper City Code Chapter 6-5-0 I 0
2. South Jordan City Code Chapter 5.32

3. Salt Lake County Code Chapter 5 .13 6
4. Holladay City Code Chapter 5.82
5. West Jordan City Code Chapter 22-11

6. :vturray City Code Chapter 5 .28
7. West Valley Municipal Code Chapter 17-26
@

8. South Salt Lake City Code 5.56
9. Salt Lake City Code 5.61
10. Cottonwood Heights City Code Chapter 5.82
11. Taylorsville City Code Chapter 5.82
12. Sandy City Code Chapter 18

13. Midvale City Code Chapter 5.12

EXHIBIT r~
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